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Abstract
Gender effects in risk taking have attracted much attention by economists, and
remain debated. Loss aversion—the stylized finding that a given loss carries sub-
stantially greater weight than a monetarily equivalent gain—is a fundamental driver
of risk aversion. We deploy four definitions of loss aversion commonly used in the
literature to investigate gender effects. Even though the definitions only differ in
subtle ways, we find women to be more loss averse than men according to one defi-
nition, while another definition results in no gender differences, and the remaining
two definitions point to women being less loss averse than men. Conceptually, these
contradictory effects can be organized by systematic measurement error resulting
from model mis-specifications relative to the true underlying decision process.
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1 Motivation
Gender effects in risk taking behaviour are a much-debated topic. The interest in dif-
ferential risk taking by the sexes can be ascribed to its role as a potential explanation
for gender differences in investment behaviour (Sunden and Surette, 1998; Dwyer, Gilke-
son and List, 2002), or for the differential willingness to compete by men and women
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2005; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). There is, however, lit-
tle agreement on whether women truly have less appetite for risk than men. While
some findings indeed suggested that this is the case (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for
a review), a recent meta-analysis has cast doubt on the universality of gender effects
(Filippin and Crosetto, 2016).
Loss aversion—the stylized finding that a given loss provides more disutility than a
monetarily equivalent gain provides utility (Markowitz, 1952; Kahneman and Tversky,
1979)—is a central component of risk aversion. Loss aversion has been used to explain
a wide variety of empirical phenomena (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Pot-
ters, 1997; Schmidt, 2003). It is thought to be the driving factor of any risk aversion
in small-stake decisions (Rabin and Thaler, 2001; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). It
further remains debated in the literature to what extent a gender effect exists for loss
aversion, with existing studies finding effects in different directions (Schmidt and Traub,
2002; Brooks and Zank, 2005; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L’Haridon, 2008; Harrison and
Rutström, 2009; Booij, Praag and van de Kuilen, 2010; Gächter, Johnson and Herrmann,
2010; Holden, 2014; Andersson, Holm, Tyran and Wengström, 2016a).
There is currently no agreement on the correct definition of loss aversion (Schmidt and
Zank, 2005). We illustrate how even subtle differences in the definition of loss aversion
may result in the estimation of contradictory gender effects. Using four definitions of
loss aversion commonly used in the literature, we show that according to one definition
women are more loss averse than men, whereas according to another there is no gender
effect; using the remaining two, we find women to be less loss averse than men. These
radically different conclusions are all the more remarkable since they are obtained i)
based on the same data; ii) based on the same functional forms and econometric setup;
and iii) using definitions that are commonly employed in the literature, and the subtleties
of which can easily escape scrutiny when presented in isolation. It should thus be clear
that the four definitions we present serve only illustrative purposes, and that additional
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variation could result from changes in some of the elements we hold constant across our
definitions.
We further show that the differences in the inferences we report originate from the
derivation of loss aversion from the combination of parameters estimated over pure gains
and over pure losses, and from the use we make of them to identify loss aversion from
decisions in mixed gain-loss tasks. Since we observe gender differences in risk preferences
over pure gains, different ways of capturing risk aversion over gains across the different
models can result in radically different conclusions about loss aversion. Ultimately,
one’s interpretation of gender effects will thus crucially depend on what one considers
the ‘correct’ interpretation of loss aversion—an issue on which scholars disagree. The
discordant findings can be conceptually organized by measurement error, which in this
case may result from modelling assumptions.
2 Definitions of loss aversion
General setup
We model preferences over binary prospects ξ = (x, 0.5; y), where the outcome x obtains
with a probability 0.5, or else y. Outcomes are modelled as changes in asset positions
relative to a status quo of zero. This status quo is induced in our experimental design
based on certainty equivalents (CEs), which serve to avoid endogenous reference points
since they compare an invariant prospect or lottery to changing sure amounts that always
fall between the outcomes of the prospect (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985). In the mixed
outcome domain, a prospect over a fixed gain and a varying loss amount is compared to
a fixed outcome of 0, which again serves to fix the reference point to zero (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992).
We model outcomes as being subjectively transformed into utilities via a mono-
tonically increasing utility function, u. Probabilities are subjectively transformed into
domain-specific decisions weights pis ≡ ws(0.5), where s indicates the sign (gains or
losses), and w : [0 1] → [0 1] is a function mapping probabilities into decision weights,
with ws(0) = 0 and ws(1) = 1. Estimating a single decision weight instead of a full
probability weighting function has the advantage that we do not need to make any as-
sumptions about the functional form of the probability weighting function (Abdellaoui
et al., 2008). For pure gains or losses the utility of a prospect takes the following form:
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U(ξ) = pisu(x) + (1− pis)u(y). (1)
For mixed prospects, the utility of a prospect can be represented as:
U(ξ) = pi+u(x) + pi−u(`), (2)
where ` represents the loss amount, and pi− = w−(0.5). This equation follows from
gain-loss separability, a principle whereby behaviour in the mixed outcome domain can
be modelled as an additive composition of the two parts taking place over pure gains
and over pure losses (Wakker, 2010).
The utility function, u, takes the form of a reference-dependent function with a kink
at the fixed reference point of u(0) = 0:
u(x) =

v(x) if x > 0
−λv(−x) if x ≤ 0 ,
(3)
where v is a value function defined over outcomes in the pure outcome domains. We
specify this function using an exponential utility function. This functional form avoids
issues of scaling encountered when using domain-specific power utility in the estimation
of loss aversion parameters (Wakker, 2010, section 9.6), which may otherwise distort the
estimated coefficient of loss aversion.1 Our results are stable to the use of alternative
functional forms. This function takes the following form:
v(x) =

1−e−µx
µ if x > 0
1−e−ν(−x)
ν if x ≤ 0 ,
(4)
where µ determines utility curvature for gains, with µ ≥ 0 indicating concavity and
µ ≤ 0 convexity of the utility function; and ν determines curvature for losses, with ν ≥ 0
indicating convexity and ν ≤ 0 concavity. The value function v and decision weights pis
1For instance, the estimated loss aversion parameter may depend on the currency in which outcomes
are denominated when adopting power utility with different parameters for gains and losses. For instance,
adopting the OPT definition discussed below, we estimate λ = 2.36 when all outcomes are divided by
the highest prize to rescale them to the unit interval, but λ = 1.01 and not significantly different from 1
when all outcomes are denominated in Euros. When all outcomes are denominated in Thai Bhat (Euros
times 20 in purchasing power parity), we obtain λ = 0.48, and significantly smaller than 1. Loss aversion
can thus be rescaled at will under this functional assumption—an element that is clearly undesirable.
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are identified from equation 1 using pure gain and pure loss prospects. Equation 2 then
identifies loss aversion, with λ the only parameter remaining to be assessed.
Definitions of loss aversion
We estimate the loss aversion coefficient from structural equations using state-of-the-art
econometric procedures—see Appendix A for details. To identify loss aversion, we use
choices between a sure outcome of 0 (not playing) and a prospect involving a given gain
x and different losses `. Substituting equation 3 into equation 2, setting v(0) = 0, and
solving the equation thus obtained for the loss aversion parameter, λ, we obtain:
λ =
pi+
pi−
v(x)
v(`)
. (5)
The loss aversion coefficient is thus identified by a ratio of the decision weights, multiplied
by a ratio of utilities (Schmidt and Zank, 2005). From this general equation, we derive
the following four definitions:
1. Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT ). This is the definition as presented in equa-
tion 5. Decision weights are allowed to differ for gains and losses in the model, i.e.
in principle pi+ 6= pi−, and hence will form integral part of the definition of the loss
aversion parameter (Schmidt and Zank, 2005; Zank, 2010). Because this definition
naturally arises out of the CPT model, this is amongst the most commonly im-
plemented definitions in structural estimations of prospect theory (Harrison and
Rutström, 2009; Booij et al., 2010; L’Haridon and Vieider, 2019).
2. Original Prospect Theory (OPT ). A drawback of the CPT definition is that the
inclusion of decision weights introduces differences between loss aversion under risk
and under certainty (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991; Gächter et al., 2010).
Under OPT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), decision weights play no role in the
definition of loss aversion (Schmidt and Zank, 2005). The definition thus simplifies
to λOPT = v(x)/v(`), where decision weights drop out since under OPT pi+ = pi−.2
2In practice, this assumption is often adopted because of data restrictions. The equality of decision
weights for 50-50 mixed prospects is, however, not the only way of obtaining this definition. For instance
the same definition may obtain because—even though decision weights are allowed to differ between gains
and losses—subjects edit out the symmetric probability in mixed decisions because of the increased
salience of the outcomes relative to probabilities in such decisions (Tversky, 1972). This definition is
also typically used in non-parametric elicitations of loss aversion (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv,
2007), where the decision weights drop out by design of the elicitation procedure. The estimated
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3. Markowitz-Expected Utility (MEU ). Although loss aversion is now seen as an in-
tegral part of prospect theory, it was already discussed and modeled by Markowitz
(1952). Since probabilities are treated linearly in Markowitz’s model, utility cur-
vature will generally not be the same as under prospect theory (Abdellaoui et al.,
2007; Booij et al., 2010). The loss aversion parameter now is λMEU = v˜(x)/v˜(`),
where the ‘tilde’ serves to remind us that the utility function is not generally the
same as the one seen above. This family of models has recently been used e.g. by
von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengström (2011) and Andersson et al. (2016a).
4. Gain-Loss Ratio (GLR). This definition obtains from equation 5 by setting pi+ = p,
pi− = 1−p and v(z) = z. For the case of p = 1−p, we thus obtain λGLR = x/`. The
GLR is often referred to as ‘behavioural loss aversion’, although we find that term
misleading, since it is not a true measure of loss aversion, but rather a measure of
risk aversion over mixed gain-loss prospects. Arguably, this definition is the most
commonly used in the literature owing to its simplicity (e.g. Tom, Fox, Trepel and
Poldrack, 2007; Gächter et al., 2010; Martino, Camerer and Adolphs, 2010).
The list of definitions provided above is not meant to be exhaustive, and additional
definitions could result from either psychological theory or changes of functional forms
(e.g., different utility specifications, or restrictions forcing the utility parameter for gains
and losses to be the same). This is of little concern here, since we intend to use these
definitions merely for illustrative purposes of what may happen to regression analysis
under different definitions of loss aversion.
3 Experimental design
We use data for close to 3000 students across 30 countries presented by Vieider, Lefebvre,
Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson (2015). The dataset con-
tains responses from a total of 2939 students across 30 countries, obtained in identical
experiments. We elicited certainty equivalents (CEs) for a total of 44 binary prospects.
We exclude 16 of those prospects which capture ambiguity attitudes, and which are ana-
lyzed in L’Haridon, Vieider, Aycinena, Bandur, Belianin, Cingl, Kothiyal and Martinsson
(2018). We further restrict our attention to prospects offering 50-50 probabilities, which
parameters under these different techniques may once again differ from the ones obtained here.
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are sufficient to identify the decision weights in our model, doing away with the necessity
of estimating full probability weighting functions (Abdellaoui et al., 2008). The tasks
included in our analysis are shown in Table 1, with prospects indicated in the form (x, y),
given that probabilities are always 50-50. Losses were implemented from an endowment
equal to the largest possible loss, and given to subjects conditional on playing out a
lottery involving losses. Tasks over pure gains and pure losses involved choices between
a lottery and sure amounts that ranged from the lowest to the highest amount in the
prospect. For the mixed prospect we elicited the loss amount ` that made a decision
maker indifferent between the prospect and the status quo of zero.
Table 1: Experimental tasks
gains losses mixed
(5 , 0) (-5 , 0) (20 , −`)
(10 , 0) (-10 , 0)
(20 , 0) (-20 , 0)
(30 , 0) (-20 , -5)
(30 , 10) (-20 , -10)
(30 , 20)
Amounts refer to PPP Euros; e1 = $1.2 PPP
Figure 1: Elicitation of loss equivalent
The mixed prospect is displayed in Figure 1. Subjects were asked to decide between
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the status quo and a lottery offering a gain of e20 or else a sequence of losses ranging
from e20 to e3. The point where a subject switched from preferring the status quo to
preferring the prospect was encoded as the loss equivalent `. We approximate the exact
amount by the mean between the last loss for which a subject preferred the status quo
and the first for which a subject preferred the lottery. Multiple switching was excluded
by design in order to avoid differing multiple switching proportions between countries,
which would have made the analysis difficult.
At the conclusion of a session, either the gain or the loss part were randomly selected
for real play. Then one of the tasks within the selected part was randomly selected and
one of the decisions was played out.3
4 Results
We regress the coefficient of loss aversion estimated according to the different definitions
on a female dummy. All regressions further include country fixed effects, with the missing
dummy indicating preferences measured in the USA. The correlations shown are stable
to inserting a host of additional demographic controls, as well as to substituting the
country dummies with macro-economic variables such as GDP per capita.
Table 2: Regression of loss aversion on individual characteristics depending on definition
GLR MEU OPT CPT
female constant female constant female constant female constant
λ 0.100∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ -0.053 1.324∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.088) (0.049) (0.095) (0.045) (0.088) (0.041) (0.070)
µ − − 0.010∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.041
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
ν − − −0.004 −0.003 −0.010∗∗ 0.016∗∗ -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
pi+ − − − − −0.009∗ 0.534∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
pi− − − − − −0.009∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.006 0.514∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
σ − − 0.009∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
* , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All regressions include country dummies.
Table 2 shows the results. According to the GLR definition, there is a significant
gender effect, indicating that women are more loss averse than men. When we adopt
3The full instructions in several languages can be found online at https://figshare.com/s/
5e655fa13f5ea76bdf99.
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the MEU or OPT definitions instead, however, this finding is exactly reversed. Women
are now found to be significantly less loss averse than men. Adopting the fully general
CPT definition, we do not detect any gender effect for loss aversion. Our conclusion on
gender effects in loss aversion will thus strongly depend on the definition of loss aversion
adopted. This is all the more remarkable since any of the definitions may appear quite
natural when presented in isolation—indeed all of the definitions presented have been
used in the literature.
Why such discordant effects? Risk preferences over pure gains and over pure losses
will influence the definition of loss aversion according to the axiom of gain-loss sepa-
rability underlying equation 2. This is easily illustrated using the average estimated
parameters. Under the GLR definition, our loss aversion measure is simply λGLR = x/−`.
Since x is fixed at e20, we can see that −` is e11.36 for men, and e10.75 for women.
That is, the maximum acceptable loss for preferring the lottery over the status quo of 0
is smaller for women, indicating increased risk aversion.
Passing to the MEU definition, these ratios of values remain the same, but they are
now transformed into utilities, so that λMEU = v(x)/v(`). Given the estimated utility
curvature parameters, the e20 gain has a utility of 16.18 for men, but only of 14.77 for
women. Meanwhile, the mean loss amount for men of e11.36 receives a utility of 11.55,
while the loss of 10.75 for women receives a utility weight of 11.17. Relative to the GLR
definition, we can thus see that, while there is little movement in the denominator, the
numerator decreases substantially for women relative to men. This movement works
towards a reduction in the utility ratio v(x)/v(`) that is much stronger for women than
for men, explaining the reversal in the estimated gender effect. For the other definitions
the issue is similar, albeit a little more complex. In particular for the CPT definition,
much of the gender differences for gains are captured by the decision weight rather than
by utility curvature. This, in turn, reduces the impact of risk aversion for gains on the
loss aversion parameter, resulting in a null finding.
All of this raises the question of which one is the ‘correct’ definition of loss aversion.
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to this question. The correct definition or
model could well be subject-specific (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2010), posing non-
trivial issues for estimations of the sort presented here. Even more generally, the validity
of the principle of gain-loss separability underlying the equation used to identify loss
aversion may be questionable from an empirical point of view (Baltussen, Post and van
9
Vliet, 2006; Wu and Markle, 2008). If that principle fails in our data, then none of the
definitions used may be correct, and specific models or identification procedures would
need to be developed that can account for such violations and accurately model decisions
over gain-loss prospects. It is tempting to conclude from all this that one ought to simply
use a non-parametric measure such as the GLR. That measure is indeed a useful metric
of risk preferences over mixed gain-loss prospects. It is, however, not a measure of loss
aversion, so that it may also suffer from systematic distortions when used as a proxy for
the latter. Although we find women to be clearly more risk averse over mixed prospect
than men, the question of whether women are truly more loss averse than men thus
remains unanswered at this point.
5 Conclusion
Gender effects in risk aversion are a much-debated topic in economics. Loss aversion—the
stylized finding that losses weigh more heavily than gains in decision processes—is
thought to constitute a fundamental psychological driver of risk aversion. However,
loss aversion has been defined in many different ways, and there is no agreement about
what the correct definition may be. Using four definitions commonly employed in the
literature, we showed that they can result in very different conclusions on gender ef-
fects—no effect, women being more loss averse than men, or women being less loss
averse than men. This finding is remarkable since all the definitions may appear natural
if presented in isolation. It goes to show how even subtle modelling assumptions can
yield different results in regression analysis, and thus presents a note of caution against
the over-interpretation of any one analysis of a specific dataset.
The insights we presented raise the question of whether an accurate measurement of
loss aversion can be obtained at all. The answer to that question will crucially depend
on one’s benchmark for accuracy. From a theoretical point of view, one may decide to
argue for a given definition as the the ‘correct’ one, and then estimate that definition
nonparametrically using tasks specifically devised to that end (see e.g. Abdellaoui et al.,
2007 and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, l’Haridon and Van Dolder, 2016). Such theory-driven
approaches, however, are challenged by findings suggesting that one of the very principles
underlying the identification of loss aversion, gain-loss separability, may be violated in
practice (Wu and Markle, 2008).
10
One can also approach the issue from an empirical standpoint. Given suitably rich
data that allow for the identification of different assumptions about the definitions and
functional forms (if any) to be deployed, it ought to be possible to identify the definition
that best fits the observed behaviour at the individual level. One can then accept the
parameter estimate emerging from the best-fitting definition as the correct one. Such an
approach immediately suggests that restrictions to the model that are purely driven by
insufficient data availability are unlikely to be optimal. Rather, one ought to move from
the model—or rather a set of models and definitions—to the data collection if one hopes
to implement such a procedure.
Even then, selecting the ‘best’ parameter based on the empirical data would be no
simple feat. Individuals are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of the definition best
fitting their choice pattern, the functional forms used for utility over gains and losses,
the stochastic process by which decisions are reached, and the extent to which they obey
gain-loss separability. Suitably identifying all these elements will require extremely rich
data, as well as heavy-handed econometrics. In practical applications, researchers will
thus still need to make choices based on their prior of which elements may be of primary
importance, and which may not.
From a conceptual point of view, the contradictory results we obtained can be thought
of as an instance of measurement error resulting from model mis-specification relative
to the true underlying decision process. The contradictory regression results can then
be explained by systematic errors in the estimation of the loss aversion parameter that
are correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables, thus leading to system-
atic bias in regression analysis (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2015, section 9-4a). Such model
mis-specifications are likely to be much more common than one may think, and are
not specific to the mixed outcome domain. This is because assumptions about and
restrictions to parametric estimations are common, either because of data restrictions,
oversight, or individual heterogeneity in the correct decision model or functional form.
Nor are such errors confined to structural models of decision making. For instance,
Crosetto and Filippin (2015) showed that estimated risk preferences may systematically
differ by measurement tasks. Such differences can once again be conceptualized as sys-
tematic measurement errors, and thus induce bias in regression analysis. Using choice
lists cut off at different points, Andersson, Tyran, Wengström and Holm (2016b) showed
that regression analysis could return a positive or a negative effect of cognitive ability
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on estimated risk aversion, depending on which of the lists was used.
Ultimately, we thus see the results presented in this paper as a call for a more system-
atic exploration of the consequences of measurement and modelling error on statistical
inferences for preference parameters. Measures of risk preferences are well known to be
noisy, and subject to contextual influences pertaining to the measurement task, the pre-
sentation of stimuli, etc. Nor is measurement error confined to preferences alone, with
many correlates investigated in the literature likely subject to systematic error as well.
Obtaining a better understanding of the direction of such measurement errors and how
they may impact empirically measured correlations—be they between different measures
of risk preferences or between risk preference measures and behaviour or dempgraphic
characteristics—will thus be crucial for a consolidation of this literature.
12
A Econometric Approach
Our econometric approach relies on directly estimating the density around the switching
point, following Bruhin et al. (2010). For a given prospect involving pure gains or pure
losses, we can represent the modelled equivalent, zˆi, as follows:
zˆi = u
−1 [pisu(xi) + (1− pis)u(yi)] , (6)
where the power −1 designates the inverse of a function. For mixed prospects involving
gains and losses, we can define the modelled equivalent loss, which we again designate by
zˆi, that makes the decision maker indifferent between the prospect and the status quo:
zˆi = v
−1
[
pi+v(xi)
λpi−
]
. (7)
The modelled equivalents in the two preceding equations depend on the estimated pref-
erence parameters {µ, ν, λ, pi+, pi−}. The difference in the identifying equation is driven
by the difference in elicitation methods for mixed prospects and for gains and losses.
We now introduce an explicit stochastic structure. The observed equivalent, zi (which
could be either a certainty equivalent, cei, or a loss equivalent, `i), will be equal to the
equivalent calculated from our model plus some independently distributed error term,
or zi = zˆi + i. Errors may be generated in utility calculation, mistakes in recording
the answers, or from the mis-specification of the model relative to the true underlying
decision process generating the data (Train, 2009). We assume this error to be normally
distributed, i ∼ N (0, σ2i ). The parameter σi indicates the standard deviation of a
so-called Fechner error (Hey and Orme, 1994). We allow for three different types of
heteroscedasticity. Firstly, the error is allowed to differ between gains and losses. For
mixed prospects, we adopt the error for losses, since it is the loss amount that varies
in the mixed choice lists. Secondly, we allow the error term to depend on the specific
prospect, or rather, on the difference between the high and low outcome in the prospect,
such that σsi = σs|xi − yi|. For the mixed prospects, the error term depends on the
maximum range in the loss domain. This takes into account that the error may be
related to the length of the choice list, which will vary with the difference between the
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two outcomes of the prospect given fixed steps between the sure amounts. Finally, we
let the error term σ depend linearly on the characteristics of the decision maker, n, so
that σs = σ0 +Xnη, with η a vector of regression parameters.
We can express the probability density function ψ(.) for a given subject n and
prospect ξi as follows
ψ(θn, ξi) = φ
(
zˆni(µn, νn, λn, pi
+
n , pi
−
n )− zni
σnis
)
(8)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and θn = {µn, νn, λn, pi+n , pi−n , σn} in-
dicates the vector of model parameters. Taking logs and summing over individuals and
prospects, we obtain the following aggregate log-likelihood function:
LL(θ) =
N∑
n=1
I∑
i=1
log [ψ(θn, ξi)] . (9)
Within this grand likelihood, we let the vector of parameters depend linearly on the
observable characteristics of decision makers, such that θn = θk +Xnγ, where θk is a k-
dimensional vector of constants corresponding to the number of parameters in our model,
Xn represents an n×m matrix of observable characteristics of the decision makers, and γ
is a m× k matrix of regression coefficients, where k indicates the number of parameters,
and m the number of predictors. We always cluster errors at the subject level.
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